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GOOD FAITH IN WARRANTIES OF HEALTH IN LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
in the case of Barker v. .etropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 N. E. 945,
clearly sets forth the distinction between a warranty of sound
health in an insurance policy and a condition precedent in the pol-
icy providing that no obligation is assumed by the insurer unless
the insured is in sound health at the date of such policy. The
above case has been criticized as supporting the doctrine that a
breach of such warranty avoids the policy, although the insured
acted in perfect good faith. A careful examination of the decision
will show, however, that the court was not concerned with the
latter point at all. The Massachusetts statute on the subject pro-
vides. in substance, that no oral or written representation or war-
ranty by the insured shall avoid the policy unless made with intent
to deceive. Rev. Laws, Mass. C. 118. sec. 21. The policy sued
upon in Barker v. Ins. Co. contained a condition precedent as above
described. The court, reversing the decision of the trial court,
holds that this statute has no relation to a condition in the policy
itself. The decision in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Howle, 62 0.
St. 204, construing a similar Ohio statute, is to the same effect.
In the absence of statutory provisions, the decisions in the
various states show an entire lack of harmony upon the question
as to whether a warranty of sound health should be placed on the
same basis as an ordinary warranty, or whether "sound health"
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is, at best, often a matter of opinion, and, therefore, good faithis all that should be required. In some jurisdictions it is con-
tended that the warranty, although absolute in its terms, is onlyto the effect that such is true to the best of the insured's knowl-
edge and belief. Schwarzbach v. 0. V. Protective Union, 25 W.Va. 622; Knights of Honor v. Dickson, 102 Tenn. 25 1. In Mouler
v. American Life Ins. Co., iII U. S. 335, Mr Justice Harlan lendshis powerful support to this view, holding that the insured, if
suffering from a latent disease, should not have the responsibilityplaced upon him of proving that which, perhaps, no one, however
skilled, could discover. The language in this case is approved inNorthwestern Aut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 54 Kan. 663, while inKnights of Honor v. Dickson, supra, the court says: " Falsehood
may be predicated of a misstatement of fact, but not of a mistaken
opinion as to whether a man has a latent disease." However
cogent this reasoning may appear, it must be conceded that itdoes not find favor in the majority of our state courts. In Ml'aine
Benefit Association v. Parks, 81 Me. 79, the court goes to the extent
of declaring the policy is void if the statements are in fact untrue,
whether such statement is to be regarded as a representation or a
warranty. The majority view, however, merely asserts that, in
case the answer is made a warranty by the terms of the policy, thegood faith of the insured is altogether immaterial. Baumgarl v.Aodern Woodmen, 85 Wis. 546; Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Young,1r3 Ind. Y59. The theorythat the insured shall be held responsi-ble for that which he does not know, and has, perhaps, no means
of finding out, certainly does not appeal to our sense of justice.The ability of the insurer to command the best of medical skill inthe making of its examination should render it unnecessary toplace any such burden upon the insured. We are inclined to
agree with Mr. Vance in his statement that the minority view isbased upon the sounder reasoning, and it is hardly just to hold
that, by an agreement of warranty, the insured intended to assume
the hazard of stating, as an ascertained fact, that which in its
nature can often be only the subject of opinion. Vance on Insur-
ance, p. 294.
STATE LIQUOR LAWS AS REGULATIONS OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The course of legislation and judicial decision on questions
relating to the regulation of interstate liquor traffic by the stateshas produced a rather curious result. This question first reached
the Supreme Court in the cases of Bowman v. Chicago Ry., 125 U. S.465, and Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. oo, and it was decided that a
state could not prohibit the importation of liquor from other states
and its sale in the original package within the prohibitory state.These decisions aroused a demand that the states be given the
necessary power by Congress, as without such power their pro-hibitory laws could be of little practical value. Congress com-plied with the demand, and enacted, by the Wilson act of i89o,
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that all liquors transported into any state or territory should, upon
arrival therein, be subject to the laws of such state or territory
enacted in the exercise of itstolicepower, 26 Stat. at L. 313. It is
worthy of note that this statute was passed with no thought of
enlarging the taxing power of the states.
This statute was held to give immediate effect to the prohibi-
tory statute of Iowa, which had thitherto been void, so that the
Iowa statute required no re-enactment. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S.
545. The term "arrival," as used in the Wilson act, was con-
strued to mean delivery to the consignee within the prohibitory
state, so that the local liquor laws could not be applied to imported
liquors while in transit from another state and before delivery to
the consignee. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412. And, at the same
term, the Supreme Court decided that, while South Carolina had
the power, under the Wilson act, to take charge, in behalf of the
state, of the sale of liquor within the state, it could not impose
burdens on the right to ship liquors from another state to a resi-
dent of South Carolina if such liquors were intended for his own
use and not for sale within the state. Vance v. Vandercook, 170
U. S. 438. Quite recently, in American Express Co. v. Iowa, x96
U. S. 133, the construction affixed to the Wilson act in the previ-
ous cases was applied, and the power of the state of Iowa to con-
trol the sale of liquors shipped from another state into that state,
after their delivery to the consignee, was upheld.
Up to this point, the decisions seem to have kept within the
real purpose of the Wilson act. But by a five-to-four decision in
the case of Pabst v. Crenshaw, 25 Sup. Ct. 552, the court has appar-
ently opened the way for state taxation of interstate commerce in
liquors. Here it was held that a state statute imposing an inspec-
tion fee upon beer and other malt liquors shipped from other
states into that state, and held there for sale and consumption
therein, must, although producing a large revenue, and not pro-
viding for more than a nominal inspection,be deemed enacted by
the state "in the exercise of its police powers," within the mean-
ing of the Wilson act, where the highest state court has upheld as
a valid police regulation so much of the statute as imposes the
same fee on beer of domestic manufacture over the objection that
it is a revenue measure and not an inspection law.
The trenchant criticism of Mr. Justice Brown, dissenting,
carries much force. In concluding, he says: " If the states may,
in the assumed exercise of police powers, enact inspection laws,
which are not such in fact, and thereby indirectly impose a rev-
enue tax on liquors, it is difficult to see any limit to this power of
taxation, or whyit may not be applied to any other articles brought
within the state, and the cases of Alinn. v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313,
and Brimmerv. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, be practically overruled. The
Wilson act does not give the legislature any greater authority with
respect to the inspection of liquors than with respect to other
imported articles, and, as already observed, it leaves the question
of inspection exactly where it found it. If the Wilson act receive
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its natural application,-that is, of meeting the exigency createdby our decision in Leisy v. Hardin, and enabling the states to en-force their prohibitory liquor laws upon the arrival of the liquor
within the state, as we have repeatedly held,-the law has a defi-
nite and distinct value, and is readily understood." In view of
the strong dissent, we may find some justification for the thought
that the court, in its desire to give the states free rein, has per-haps raised a cause of interstate friction which federal control
might have prevented.
LEGISLATIVE ALTERATION OF CONTRACT RELATIONS AMONG
STOCKHOLDERS.
The case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 5i8,
while it decided that the charter of a private corporation consti-
tutes a contract beyond the power of a state to impair, neverthe-
less did not analyze that contract, nor point out its parties. Threedistinct sets of contractual relations might have been regarded by
that court as the basis of their decision, namely: (i) A contractbet ween the state and the incorporators; (2) The contract of theincorporators among themselves; (3) The contracts of trust created
by donors to the College, as these donations necessarily involved
reliance on the charter-granted rights. Of these three con-tracts, the first two were involved in the formation of business
corporations, and, in construing clauses which reserved a right to
amend or repeal, the courts soon differed as to whether such
clauses applied solely to the contract between the state and theincorporators, or whether they applied to the mutual agreements
of the incorporators as well.
The recent case of Hinckley v. Schwarzchild Co., 34 N. Y. LawJ. 89, (App. Div.), illustrates a tendency in New York to extend
the scope of such a clause and allow the legislature to alter very
considerably the interrelations of shareholders. Here it was held
that the Statute of 19o (chap. 354), dispensing with the previous
requirement of unanimous consent for the issuance of preferred
stock in a corporation, and allowing such issuance on a two-thirds
vote of the stockholders, applies to pre-existing corporations, im-pairs no contract or vested right of a protesting minority share-
holder, and is a valid exercise of the power reserved by the con-
stitution to alter or repeal charters of corporations. The decision
is expressly based on authority rather than on principle.This case seems to go further than the case of Payson v. Withers,
5 Biss. 269, in which it was held that a charter fixing the capital
stock of a corporation at $r,ooo, ooo and providing for its increase
to not over $5, ooo, ooo at the discretion of the stockholders, mightbe amended by statute so as to authorize the board of directors toincrease the capital stock at their discretion, and that such an
amendment did not release a prior subscription to the stock. Thisholding was endorsed in Payson v. Stoever, 2 Dill. 427.
This line of authority seems to place no limit on the reserved
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power to amend, save where injury to property rights will clearly
result from the amendment. Thus an amendment giving muni-
cipalities preference over other stockholders of a railroad in the
distribution of its assets on dissolution, was held not within the
reserved power, in Hilly. Glasgow Ry. Co., r Fed. 6io (C.C.).
An opposing line of decisions holds that the power to amend
is reserved solely for the benefit of the state, and that amend-
ments are not valid under this power if they alter the mutual con-
tract of the shareholders without serving some clearly public pur-
pose. The power to amend should certainly be limited to amend-
ments pertinent to the business and objects for which the corpo-
ration was organized. Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42. A law
altering the voting power of the shareholders in a corporation,
and so impairing their control over their own enterprise, would
clearly be unconstitutional. State v. Greer, 78 Mo. x88. In New
Jersey, the view that the object of the reserved power was to give
the majority of the corporators control over the minority, with
the consent of the legislature, has never been adopted. There
the legislature may, within limits, impose alterations deemed nec-
essary for the public good, but cannot otherwise permit altera-
tions in the contract among the stockholders without the consent
of all parties thereto. Zabriskie v. .- lackensack Ry. Co., 18 N. J.
Eq. z78, 191, 192. Possibly the frank recognition in such cases
as Hinckley v. Schwarzcild Co., supra, that the New Jersey doc-
trine rests on a better basis of principle, may lead to a solution
of the conflict over the extent of the power to amend.
